

Neural Network Abstraction for Accelerating Verification

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Abstract—While abstraction is a classic tool of verification, it is not often in use for verification of neural networks. We introduce an abstraction framework applicable to feed-forward networks. For the particular case of ReLU, we can provide error bounds incurred by the abstraction. We show how the abstraction reduces the size of the network, while preserving its accuracy and how verification results on the abstract network can be transferred back to the original network.

I. INTRODUCTION

Neural Networks (NN) are successfully used to solve many hard problems reasonably well in practice. However, there is an increasing desire to use them also in safety-critical settings, such as perception in autonomous cars [?], where reliability has to be on a very high level and that level has to be guaranteed, preferably by a rigorous proof. This is a great challenge, in particular, since NN are naturally very susceptible to adversarial attacks, as many works have demonstrated in the recent years [?], [?]. Consequently, various verification techniques for NN are being developed these days. Most verification techniques focus on proving robustness of the neural networks, i.e. for a classification task, when the input is perturbed by a small ε , the resulting output should be labeled the same as the output of the original input. Unfortunately, verification tools struggle to scale when faced with real-world neural networks. Reducing the size of a NN by abstraction leads to several possibilities. Firstly, since the abstracted NN is smaller, it may be preferred in practice because generally smaller networks are often more robust, smoother, and obviously less resource-demanding to run [?]. Note that there is a large body of work on distilling smaller NN from larger ones, e.g. [?], i.e. training a smaller NN based on the output of a bigger one. Secondly, and more interestingly in the safety-critical context, we can use the smaller abstract NN to obtain a guaranteed solution (robust or satisfying other properties) to the original problem: We can analyze the abstract NN more easily as it is smaller and then transfer the results to the original one, provided the differences are small enough.

Abstraction is one of the very classic techniques used in formal methods to obtain more understanding of a system as well as its better analysis.

We developed an abstraction framework for NN. In contrast to syntactic similarities, such as having similar weights on the edges from the previous layer [?], our aim is to provide a behavioral, semantic notion of similarity, such as those of predicate abstraction, since such notions are more powerful.

First, we describe a way to find similar neurons in the network and once we have them, we can merge each class into a single representative and obtain a smaller, abstract NN. Secondly, we show how the verification on the abstraction can be lifted to the original.

II. ABSTRACTION

a) Merging: Note that in many cases, such as recognition of traffic signs or numbers, there are finitely many (say k) interesting data points (images) on which and on whose neighborhood the network should work well. Intuitively, these are the key points that determine our focus, our scope of interest. Consequently, we propose the following equivalence on neurons. We evaluate the k inputs, yielding for each neuron a k -tuple of its activation values. We propose to merge neurons which compute a similar function *on some set X of inputs*, i.e., for each input $x \in X$ to the network, they compute ε -close values. We refer to this as I/O-similarity. Further, we choose to merge neurons only within the same layer to keep the analysis and implementation straightforward. I/O-similar neurons can be merged easily without changing the behaviour of the NN too much.

Formally, the process of merging two neurons p and q belonging to the same layer ℓ works as follows. We assume, without loss of generality, that p is retained as the representative. First, the abstract network \tilde{D} is set to the original network D . Next, $\tilde{W}^{(\ell-1)}$ is set to $W^{(\ell-1)}$ with the q^{th} row deleted. Further, we set the outgoing weights of the representative p to the sum of outgoing weights of p and q , $\tilde{W}_{*,p}^{(\ell)} = W_{*,p}^{(\ell)} + W_{*,q}^{(\ell)}$. This procedure is naturally extendable to merging multiple I/O-similar neurons. It can be applied repeatedly until all desired neurons are merged.

b) Verification: So far, we have generated an abstract NN, on which we can run a verification algorithm, for which we chose DeepPoly [?]. Due to space issues, a description of DeepPoly is omitted here, but can be found in the original paper. Let just be noted that it is an incomplete algorithm that can only state that a property can be verified but cannot give a counterexample. After running the algorithm on an input x , we receive as a result either that the abstract NN is robust for this input or we don't get anything. Assume, that we could verify the safety property for input x on the abstracted NN \tilde{D} , we can now perform the *proof-lifting*, i.e. we can give error bounds for our abstraction. Given those bounds, we can then present guarantees on the original NN.

c) *Lifting guarantees:* Consider the abstraction \tilde{D} obtained from a NN D . If we have the lower bound and upper bound vectors returned by DeepPoly and the vector of maximal distances of neurons from their cluster representatives. Then we can compute upper and lower bounds $\hat{u}^{(\ell)}$ and $\hat{l}^{(\ell)}$ for the activation values of all neurons in all layers. Having upper and lower bounds for all values imposes an over-approximation of the behavior of the NN. Based on these values, one can check whether a specific property is fulfilled, just as DeepPoly does. The bounds already contain the error from the abstraction and are thus valid for the original network. This is how we can lift the satisfaction result of a specific property to the original NN.

III. RESULTS

We performed experiments on different networks and different datasets. With abstraction, we are able to reduce the size of the networks up to 50%. By using DeepPoly, we can show that the reduction of the size correlates with the reduction of time that is needed for verification. Thus, we can speed up the verification time in the best case by the factor 10.

Additionally, we ran experiments to demonstrate the working of the full verification pipeline — involving clustering to identify the neurons that can be merged, performing the abstraction, running DeepPoly on the abstraction and finally lifting the verification proof to answer the verification query on original network.

We were interested in two parameters: (i) the time taken to run the full pipeline; and (ii) the number of verification queries that could be satisfied (out of 200). We ran experiments on a network with 6 layers and 300 nodes in each trained on the MNIST-dataset [?]. It could be verified to be locally robust for 197/200 images in 48 minutes by DeepPoly. In the best case, our preliminary implementation of the full pipeline was able to verify robustness for 195 images in 36 minutes — 13s for clustering and abstracting, 35 min for verification, and 5s for proof lifting. In other words, a 14.7% reduction in network size produced a 25% reduction in verification time. When we pushed the abstraction further to obtain a reduction of 19.4% in the network size, DeepPoly could still verify robustness of the abstracted network for 196 images in just 34 minutes (29% reduction). However, in this case, the proof could not be lifted to the original network as the over-approximations we obtained were too coarse.

IV. RELATED WORK

In contrast to compression techniques, our abstraction provides a mapping between original neurons and abstract neurons, which allows for transferring the claims of the abstract NN to the original one, and thus its verification.

The very recent work [?] suggests an abstraction, which is based solely on the sign of the effect of increasing a value in a neuron. While we can demonstrate our technique on e.g. 784 dimension input (MNIST) and work with general networks, [?] is demonstrated only on the Acas Xu [?] networks which have 5 dimensional input; our approach handles thousands of nodes

while the benchmark used in [?] is of size 300. Besides, we support both classification and regression networks. Finally, our approach is not affected by the number of outputs, whereas the [?] grows exponentially with respect to number of outputs.

Further, [?] computes a similarity measure between incoming weights and then starts merging the most similar ones. It also features an analysis of how many neurons to remove in order to not lose too much accuracy. However, it does not use clustering on the semantic values of the activations, but only on the syntactic values of the incoming weights, which is a very local and thus less powerful criterion.

Similarly, [?] clusters based on the incoming weights only and does not bound the error. [?] clusters weights (in contrast to our activation values) using the k-means clustering algorithm. However, the focus is on weight-sharing and reducing memory consumption, treating neither the abstraction mapping nor verification.

V. OUTLOOK

The most important difference to other compression frameworks is that this approach provides a semantic link between the original states and the abstract states. This in principle allows for abstraction-based verification of neural networks. The next steps are to provide more practical heuristics and to extend the framework to convolutional networks and other layer types, as well as trying different compression techniques than just clustering, e.g. principal component analysis.

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