Abstract of /TIGKI/INFOSYS/FKI/FKI-238-00
Title: Exploring auction-based leveled-commitment contracting
Part III: Vickrey-type auctioning
Authors: Felix Brandt
Category: Technical Report (Forschungsberichte Künstliche Intelligenz)
Abstract: A key problem addressed in the area of multiagent systems
is the automated assignment of multiple tasks to executing
agents.The automation of multiagent task assignment
requires that the individual agents (i) use a common protocol
that prescribes how they have to interact in order to come to
an agreement and (ii) fix their final agreement in a contract
that specifies the commitments resulting from the assignment
on which they agreed.
The work reported in this paper is part of a broader research
effort aiming at the design and analysis of approaches to
automated multiagent task assignment that combine auction
protocols and leveled commitment contracts. The primary
advantage of such approaches is that they are applicable in a
broad range of realistic scenarios in which
knowledge-intensive negotiation among agents is
not feasible and in which unforeseeable future environmental
changes may require agents to breach their contracts.
Examples of standard auction protocols are the English
auction, the Dutch auction, and the Vickrey auction.
In ,  combinations of English/Dutch-type auctioning
and leveled commitment contracting have been described. In
this report the focus is on the combination of Vickrey-type
auctioning and leveled commitment contracting.
Keywords: automated task-assignment in multiagent systems,
auctioning, leveled commitment contracting.
Size: 15 pages
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